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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
CHRISTOPHER DALE BRIGGS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 44328
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2016-942
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christopher Briggs, pled guilty to one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

He received a unified

sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Briggs contends that, in
light of the new information presented in support of his I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion,1 the court’s mistake of fact regarding Mr. Briggs’ previous probation

1

Although the State claims that the information submitted in support of his Rule 35
motion was not new (Respondent’s Brief, pp.3-5), it was not until after sentencing when
Mr. Briggs’ apparently well-founded concerns that IDOC’s housing placement may
forestall his treatment were realized, so that Mr. Briggs had new or additional
information to attached to his Rule 35 motion (R., pp.61-66).
1

opportunities, and the mitigating circumstances present at sentencing, the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous contentions in its
Respondent’s Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of Facts were previously articulated in Mr. Briggs’ Appellant’s
Brief. They are incorporated herein by reference.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Briggs’ Idaho Criminal Rule
35 Motion in light of the new information provided in support thereof, and the district
court’s erroneous belief that Mr. Briggs had received multiple rehabilitative opportunities
by being placed on probation in 2005 and 2009?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Briggs’ Rule 35 Motion In
Light Of The New Information Provided In Support Thereof, And The District Court’s
Erroneous Belief That Mr. Briggs Had Received Multiple Rehabilitative Opportunities By
Being Placed On Probation In 2005 And 2009
The State claims that the district court’s mistake of fact did not affect its ultimate
decision to deny Mr. Briggs’ Rule 35 motion. However, the district court stated its belief
that Mr. Briggs had multiple rehabilitative opportunities in the community; thus, the
district court refused “to expedite this Defendant’s treatment over those within the
Department of Corrections [sic] that have not yet had the opportunity for that treatment.”
(R., p.73.)
The factors that a district court may consider in imposing sentence (and
concomitantly, in executing the underlying sentence following a probation violation) are
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protection of society, deterrence of the individual and the public generally, the possibility
of rehabilitation, and punishment. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).
When a district court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it,
and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600
(1989).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that “[w]hen a discretionary ruling has been
tainted by legal or factual error, we ordinarily vacate the decision and remand the matter
for a new, error-free discretionary determination by the trial court.” State v. Upton, 127
Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 1043 (Ct. App.
1985)). The Upton Court also held “a remand may be avoided where it is apparent from
the record that the result would not change or that a different result would represent an
abuse of discretion.” Id.
In its written Rule 35 decision, the district court wrote that it was not reducing
Mr. Briggs’ sentence because it “is not convinced that altering Defendant’s sentence
would benefit society or would create a greater possibility of rehabilitation.” (R., p.73.)
The court repeated Mr. Briggs’ position—that he had “never had rehabilitative
programming except growing up supervised in the juvenile corrections systems and a
rider, from which he was relinquished.” (R., p.73; PSI, p.25.) However, the court then
wrote that it disagreed with Mr. Briggs’ representation because he had been out on
probation in two previous cases—his 2006 federal case and the 2009 state possession
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of a controlled substance case, but the court was mistaken—Mr. Briggs was not placed
on probation in either case—he went to prison.2

(PSI, pp.8-10, 25.)

Despite his

desperate need for substance abuse treatment, Mr. Briggs has never had any
significant drug treatment for his severe methamphetamine addiction.

(PSI,

p.25;4/28/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-25.)
The district court’s decision to deny Mr. Briggs’ Rule 35 motion was based almost
solely on the district court’s factually erroneous belief that Mr. Briggs had multiple
opportunities for probation. In denying the Rule 35 motion, the court certainly focused
on rehabilitation. (R., pp.73-74.) The court looked at whether reducing Mr. Briggs’
sentence “would benefit society or would create a greater possibility of rehabilitation.”
(R., p.73.) The district court relied on its mistake of fact to doubt Mr. Briggs’ claims that
he had not had rehabilitative programming in the community since he was in the
juvenile corrections system.3 (R., p.73.) Further, the court wrote that while it “agrees
the Defendant is in need of rehabilitative treatment, the court is not willing to expedite
this Defendant’s treatment over those within the Department of Corrections [sic] that
have not yet had the opportunity for that treatment.” (R., p.73.) Because thirty-seven
year old Mr. Briggs had not actually received community-based drug treatment or
programming through a correctional organization since 1997, the court’s decision to
revoke probation was tainted by factual error. See Upton, 127 Idaho at 276.
2

As Mr. Briggs pointed out in his Appellant’s Brief, he was incarcerated on the 2009
conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance from July 2009 to November
2010 and was never placed on probation in that case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.) In
2005, Mr. Briggs was convicted of a federal possession of weapons charge, and the
federal court initially sentenced him to an 18-month period of incarceration followed by 3
months of supervised release. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.)
3
Mr. Briggs’ juvenile conviction and rider programming were in 1997, twenty years ago.
(PSI, p.5.)
4

Although the State claims that “[b]ecause the same result would have been
reached without the alleged error, any such error was necessarily harmless”; however,
this is an incorrect statement of the applicable test. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-9.) The
record is clear that the court’s Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence
was based largely on the factual error about Mr. Briggs’ failures to rehabilitate after his
opportunities on probation. (See R., pp.73-74.) On this record, it cannot be said that
the result would have been the same if the district court had understood the information
in front of it. Cf. Upton, 127 Idaho at 276-77 (holding the record made it “abundantly
clear” the district court would have revoked the defendant’s probation even if the district
court had found no noncompliance with a condition of probation).
Thus, because the district court’s discretionary decision to deny Mr. Briggs’ Rule
35 motion was tainted by factual error, the order denying Mr. Briggs’ Rule 35 motion
should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new, error-free discretionary
determination by the district court. See Upton, 127 Idaho at 276.
Where the district court made a mistake of fact in its discretionary decision, a
remand is necessary unless the district court’s own reasoning showed that the result
would not change even if the correct facts were applied.

Since the district court

explained its reasoning in its order denying and primarily only addressed its
rehabilitation considerations, the case must be remanded for rehearing under the proper
standard.

5

CONCLUSION
Mr. Briggs respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it sees
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

6

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of February, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
CHRISTOPHER DALE BRIGGS
INMATE #51232
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
LYNN G NORTON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
IAN H THOMSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

___________/s/______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas

7

